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1 
Aristotle and the value of tragedy 
MALCOLM HEATH (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) 
ABSTRACT: 7KLV SDSHU H[SORUHV $ULVWRWOH¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH YDOXH RI
tragedy. The primarily technical analyses of the Poetics are not sufficient for this 
SXUSRVH WKH\ PXVW EH UHDG LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI $ULVWRWOH¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO
DQWKURSRORJ\$QRXWOLQHRI$ULVWRWOH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVWUXFWXUHRIKXPDQ
motivation will provide a framework within which to interpret his discussion of 
WKHXVHVRIPXVLFDQGLQSDUWLFXODURIPXVLF¶VVWDWXVDVDQLQWULQVLFDOO\YDOXDEOH
component of cultivated leisure. Applying that model to tragedy requires an 
explanation of what motivates engagement with drama that evokes distressing 
affects. AristotOH¶VDFFRXQWRIPXVLFDOkatharsis, if read with sufficient attention 
to its structure and interpreted in the light of his analysis of pleasure, provides a 
solution. If the importance which Aristotle attaches to intrinsically valuable 
leisure activities is overlooked, it is not possible to understand his conception of 
a good human life, or his aesthetics. 
What motivates human beings to invest time and effort in producing and 
consuming tragedies? And how does that investment contribute to a 
characteristically human way of life? That is, what value attaches to the 
production and consumption of tragedies? Though Aristotle touches briefly on 
SRHWU\¶VURRWVLQKXPDQQDWXUHDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIPoetics 4, for the most part the 
existence of poetry and its diverse kinds is treated in the Poetics, not as an 
explanandum, but as the starting-point for technical analyses of how poems, in 
their various kinds, are best composed. The Poetics H[DPLQHVKRZSRHWU\¶VYDOXH
may be realised most effectively, but does not provide fully articulated answers to 
questions about the nature of that value. That has not prevented readers from 
wondering what answers he might have given²nor should it. But an indirect 
approach is needed: the primarily technical analysis of good tragedy in the Poetics 
QHHGVWREHUHDGLQWKHFRQWH[WRI$ULVWRWOH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDODQWKURSRORJ\1 In this 
SDSHUDQRXWOLQHRI$ULVWRWOH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHGLVWLQFWLYHVWUXFWXUHRIKXPDQ
motivation (§1) will provide a framework within which to make sense of his 
discussion of the uses of music in Politics 8, and (in particular) of its status as an 
intrinsically valuable component of cultivated leisure (§2). That provides a model 
for an Aristotelian account of the value of tragedy, but leaves a familiar problem 
unresolved: what motivates engagement with drama that is affectively distressing 
(§3)? It is widely supposed that katharsis SURYLGHVDNH\WR$ULVWRWOH¶VVROXWLRQWR
this problem. That, I (now) think, is right; but to justify that conclusion it is 
necessary to read $ULVWRWOH¶V DFFRXQW RI katharsis with careful attention to its 
structure (§4), and to interpret it in the light of his analysis of pleasure (§5).  
                                                 
1
 For a brief preview of this project see Malcolm Heath, Ancient Philosophical Poetics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 56-103; it will be developed more fully in 
Poetical Animals: Aristotle, Anthropology and Poetry (in preparation). The underlying research 
was supported by the Leverhulme Trust (Major Research Fellowship F10099B). Translations from 
Aristotle are my own.  
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1. Human Motivation 
+XPDQPRWLYDWLRQLQ$ULVWRWOH¶VYLHZKDVDXQLTXHVWUXFWXUH7KHEHKDYLRXU
of nonhuman animals is driven by the pleasure and distress evoked by perception. 
The same is true of some human behaviour; but humans are also capable of acting 
from deliberate choice: they can choose to do A because of (dia), or for the sake 
of (heneka), B. That is a uniquely human capacity, because it depends on causal 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LQ $ULVWRWOH¶V VHQVH µWKH IRU-the-sake-of-ZKLFK¶ LV KLV IDYRXUHG
expression for the final cause). The B because of which a human being chooses to 
do A is sometimes a bodily pleasure of a kind that nonhuman animals also 
experience; but human choices may be guided by a wider range of values: for 
example, one may choose to do something because it is beneficial or just. The 
sharing of this extended range of values is, for Aristotle, what distinguishes 
human language from the communicative vocalisations of nonhuman animals, and 
is constitutive of human communities (Pol. 1.2, 1253a7-18).  
Aristotle insists that chains of deliberative reasoning must terminate 
somewhere. I may choose to do A because of B, and B because of C; but choice 
would succumb to a futile regress if deliberation did not at some point fix on 
something that is chosen, not (or not only) because of something else, but because 
of itself (NE 1.2, 1094a18-22). What is worth choosing only because of something 
else is of less value than what is worth choosing because of itself (1.7, 1097a25-
b6). There is just one thing that is chosen always and only because of itself, and 
never because of something else: eudaimonia²the best kind of life, whatever that 
may turn out to be (1097a33-b6). But many things are chosen both because of 
themselves and because of something else. Aristotle identifies such cases by 
applying a counter-factual test: would this thing still be worth choosing in the 
absence of that other thing?2 This (we might say) is a test of its having intrinsic 
YDOXH,Q$ULVWRWHOLDQHWKLFVDQDFW¶VEHLQJFKRVHQEHFDXVHRILWVLQWULQVLFYDOXHLV
one of the conditions of its being virtuous (2.4, 1105a32). So, for example, a 
soldier who would not think it worth risking his life in battle without the incentive 
of extrinsic goods (honour, payment, or the avoidance of punishment) does not 
regard courageous action as worth choosing because of itself. So, even if he does 
what a courageous person would do, he is not doing it as the courageous person 
would (2.4, 1105b5-9), and is therefore not exercising the virtue of courage.  
$ULVWRWOHRIWHQVSHDNVRIYLUWXRXVDFWLRQEHLQJFKRVHQEHFDXVHRI µWKHILQH¶3 
(to kalon: e.g. NE 4.1, 1120a23-9; 9.8, 1168a33-4; EE 3.1, 1230a26-32). This is 
virtually equivalent to saying that it is chosen because of itself: to choose a fine 
thing because of itself is to choose it because it is fine. But not everything that is 
worth choosing because of itself is fine: the fine is a pre-eminent subset of things 
that are good by nature and chosen for themselves (EE 8.3, 1248b16-19). In 
                                                 
2
 See NE 1.7, 1097b2-4; 6.12, 1144a1-3; 10.3, 1174a4-8; Rhet. 1.6, 1362b25-7, with b2-4; Top. 
3.1, 116a29-39, 117a2-4.  
3
 This opaque expression (a calque on the Greek article + adjective construction, designating both 
µZKDWLVĭ¶DQGµWKHTXDOLW\RIEHLQJĭ¶LVDSODFHKROGHUIRUDWHUPVSDQQLQJHWKLFDODnd aesthetic 
YDOXH7+,UZLQµ7KHVHQVHDQGUHIHUHQFHRIțĮȜંȞLQ$ULVWRWOH¶Classical Philology 105 (2010), 
381-396, illustrates the range of applications in Aristotle, but does not engage closely with the 
quasi-technical use explained below. 
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ethics, that subset comprises things that are chosen for themselves and are 
praiseworthy (b19-25; cf. 1249a25), i.e. virtue and virtuous action (2.1, 1220a7-
10). The pre-eminent status of virtue means, for example, that although honour is 
also an intrinsic good, doing what a virtuous person would do only for the sake of 
honour is an ethical failure. Sparta, which repeatedly provides Aristotle with a 
case-study of a society that has gone subtly but disastrously wrong in its values, 
illustrates the point (8.3, 1248b37-9a16). The Spartans value virtuous actions, but 
do so only because of other things to which those actions lead, such as honour, 
wealth and power. Those things are genuinely worth choosing for their own sake; 
to that extent, Spartan values are correct. But because the Spartans do not value 
virtuous actions for their own sake, they do not havHµFRPSOHWHYLUWXH¶7KH\DUH
good (agathosEXWWKH\DUHQRWµILQHDQGJRRG¶kalos kagathos).4  
+XPDQV GR QRW SRVVHVV YLUWXHV E\ QDWXUH WKH\ µare naturally receptive of 
WKHP EXW DUH FRPSOHWHG E\ KDELW¶ (NE 2.1, 1103a23-6). So virtue depends on 
educatiRQ0RUDOHGXFDWLRQUHTXLUHVWKHVKDSLQJRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VGLVSRVLWLRQVWR
feel pleasure and distress. That is not to say that virtuous individuals perform 
virtuous actions because doing so will give them pleasure: virtuous action is 
chosen because of itself, or because it is fine. Even so, the action will give them 
SOHDVXUH VLQFH LW LV LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKHLU FKDUDFWHU )RU WKLV UHDVRQ µPRUDO
H[FHOOHQFHLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKSOHDVXUHVDQGSDLQV¶NE 2.3, 1104b15-DQGµWKH
effect on our actions of our feeling pleasure and distress well or badly is not 
WULYLDO¶D-6).  
2. Music  
7KHHWKLFDOLPSRUWDQFHRISOHDVXUHDQGGLVWUHVVLVRQHUHDVRQZK\$ULVWRWOH¶V
discussion of education in Politics 8 pays so much attention to music. Melody and 
rhythm are naturally pleasurable (Pol. 8.5, 1340a14, b16-17); moreover, melodies 
DQGUK\WKPVPD\FRUUHVSRQGWRFRQWDLQµOLNHQHVVHVRI¶D-39) states 
of character. Consequently, by controlling the music to which children are 
exposed (and, in particular, exposed as active participants, when they learn to play 
an instrument: 8.6, 1340b20-5), educators can produce an habitual association 
between the natural pleasure of music and the ethically desirable states of 
character that correspond to those melodies and rhythms. This character-shaping 
exploitation of the pleasure of music is not sufficient to produce virtuous character 
(one becomes virtuous by performing virtuous actions: NE 2.4, 1105a17-b12), but 
it facilitates the formation of the positive attitudes towards virtue that are 
necessary if one is to perform virtuous actions as the virtuous person would.  
Ethical formation is not, however, the only reason why musical education is 
important to Aristotle. It is also a preparation for the proper use of leisure in 
adulthood (Pol. 8.3, 1337b22-8b4). Aristotle is scornful of the notion that 
HGXFDWLRQ¶VSULPDU\IXQFWLRQLVWRHTXLSSHRSOHZLWKµXVHIXO¶DFFRPSOLVKPHQWVµWR
be asking all the time what use something is, is highly inappropriate for people 
who are great-souOHG DQG IUHH¶ E-4). As has already been said, what is 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed analysis of EE 8.3 see 6DUDK%URDGLHµ7KHJRRGWKHQREOHDQGWKHWKHRUHWLFDOLQ
the Eudemian Ethics¶ in John Cottingham and Peter Hacker (eds), Mind, Method, and Morality: 
Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 6-25.  
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worth choosing only because of something else is of less value than what is worth 
FKRRVLQJEHFDXVHRILWVHOI6RLWLVLPSRUWDQWWKDWWKRVHZKROLNH$ULVWRWOH¶VHOLWH
readership, have significant amounts of unconstrained time at their disposal learn 
how to allocate that time to activities that are worth choosing because of 
WKHPVHOYHV 7KLV LV DQRWKHU DUHD LQ ZKLFK 6SDUWD¶V GHIHFWLYH V\VWHP RI YDOXHV
manifests itself (8.4, 1338b9-32; cf. 7.14, 1333b5-16; 7.15, 1334a40-b5).  
It is necessary to distinguish between candidate leisure activities that are 
genuinely worth choosing because of themselves and those that are not: leisure 
should not be squandered on trivial amusements. That is not to say that trivial 
amusements have no value: they can help us relax. But relaxation is recovery 
from, and preparation for return to, work (Pol. 8.3, 1337b33-8a1). Relaxation, 
therefore, is chosen because of something else; leisure activities are not. Aristotle 
sharply distinguishes relaxation, which is constrained by work, from the 
unconstrained activity of leisure, and his educational recommendations have the 
SURSHU XVH RI WKLV XQFRQVWUDLQHG WLPH DV WKHLU JRDO µLW LV FOHDU WKDW RQH VKRXOG
learn and be taught certain things with a view to leisure activity, and that these 
things that are taught and learned are for their own sake, whereas those with a 
view to non-OHLVXUHDUHQHFHVVDU\DQGIRUWKHVDNHRIRWKHUWKLQJV¶D-13). 
We have seen that, though virtuous actions are not performed because they 
JLYHSOHDVXUHEXWEHFDXVHRIµWKHILQH¶WKH\GRJLYHSOHDVXUHWRYLUWXRXVSHRSOH
Aristotle recognises a parallel between ethical and aesthetic value in this respect: 
µa morally good man, qua morally good, delights in virtuous actions and is 
displeased by ones arising from vice, just as a musical man takes pleasure in fine 
PHORGLHVEXWLVSDLQHGDWEDGRQHV¶ (NE 9.9, 1170a8-,QHWKLFVµILQH¶SLFNVRXW
those things worth choosing because of themselves that are also praiseworthy, i.e. 
virtue and virtuous action. That ethical definition is repeated in the Rhetoric 
µZKDWHYHUEHLQJZRUWKFKRRVLQJLQLWVHOILVSUDLVHZRUWK\¶EXWZLWKWKHDGGLWLRQ
of an alternative formula which seems more applicable to the aesthetic case: 
µZKDWHYHU EHLQJ JRRG LV SOHDVDQW EHFDXVH LW LV JRRG¶  D-4). The 
implication that there is more than one way in which something can be a source of 
SOHDVXUHLVFRQILUPHGE\$ULVWRWOH¶VDFFRXQWRIPXVLF:HKDYHDOUHDG\REVHUYHG
that there is a natural pleasure in melody and rhythm (Pol. 8.5, 1340a14, b16-17). 
But in his discussion of musical education Aristotle recommends that children 
VKRXOG OHDUQ WR SOD\ DQ LQVWUXPHQW µXQWLO WKH\ DUH able to take pleasure in fine 
melodies and rhythm, and not merely in the common element of music, as even 
VRPH QRQKXPDQ DQLPDOV GR DQG DOVR WKH PDVV RI VHUYLOH SHRSOH DQG FKLOGUHQ¶
(8.6, 1341a13-17). There are, then, two ways to take pleasure in music, and the 
goal of musical education is achieved when the second becomes accessible. 
Initially, music has only a subjective value for young people, dependent on the 
natural pleasure in melody and rhythm. The goal of musical education is to enable 
a young person to distinguish melodies and rhythms that are fine from those that 
are not, and to take pleasure in those melodies and rhythms because they are fine. 
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Their cultivated musical taste5 gives them access to an objective value, the 
recognition of which is a source of pleasure. 
3. Tragedy 
Should we extend the model of music to tragedy? Evidence that we should 
FRPHV IURP $ULVWRWOH¶V Protrepticus (a lost work that can be partially 
reconstructed from later sources).6 In it Aristotle made a case for the value of 
philosophy, and had to counter the objections of those who dismiss philosophy 
because it is (allegedly) useless. He uses the regress argument to show the 
absurdity of demanding that everything needs to be valued because of something 
else. He also reminds his opponents that there are things which they themselves 
value even though they are not useful: they watch athletics and drama, not 
because watching them brings any extrinsic benefit, but because they are 
intrinsically worth watching (F44 Düring). So watching drama and athletics, as 
well as listening to music, are appropriate leisure activities.  
A qualification is needed. Though melody and rhythm are, in principle, 
naturally pleasant, there is bad music which gives pleasure only to unnaturally 
distorted souls (Pol. 8.7, 1342a18-28);7 and not all naturally pleasant melodies 
DQG UK\WKPV DUH µILQH¶ 0XVLF YDULHV LQ TXDOLW\ DQG TXDOLILHV DV DQ DSSURSULDWH
object of leisured attention to the extent that it approaches the highest levels of 
excellence. The same is true of tragedy: it is clear from the Poetics that tragedies 
range from the defective to the excellent. Likewise, the example of athletics in 
Protrepticus is, more precisely, of athletics at the Olympic games. This places one 
constraint on the kinds of thing that are potentially appropriate objects of leisured 
attention: if it is to be possible to distinguish routine from excellent instances, 
there must be sufficient scope for complexity, or for difficulty of conception or 
execution, to provide a basis for that distinction. That in turn means that the object 
of attention will demand a highly developed capacity for discriminating 
appreciation²which is why the education of musical discernment is important as 
preparation for adult leisure.  
However, we must not forget that we are concerned with objects of 
appreciative human attention.8 There must be some congruence between them and 
                                                 
5
 Aristotle uses this metaphor for the appreciative experience of intrinsic value in an ethical context 
(NE 10.6, 1176b19-21; 10.9, 1179b13-16), though not in an aesthetic context. 
6
 6HH '6 +XWFKLQVRQ DQG 0RQWH 5DQVRPH -RKQVRQ µ$XWKHQWLFDWLQJ $ULVWRWOH¶V Protrepticus¶
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29 (2005), 193-294. The fragment cited here is Aristotle fr. 
58 Rose (= fr. 42-44 Düring), recovered from Iamblichus Protrepticus 52.16-54.5 Pistelli. 
Hutchinson and Johnson provide an English translation (pp. 260-261); see also Anton-Hermann 
Chroust, Aristotle: Protrepticus. A Reconstruction (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1964), 17-19 (fr. 40-42).  
7
 In this passage Aristotle licences performance of such music in his ideal city, on the grounds that 
the kind of people who enjoy it need opportunities for relaxation. 
8
 The object that is most worthy of appreciative attention (WKHǀULD) without qualification is the 
universe, and Aristotle argues in NE 10.7-8 that living well (eudaimonia) is paradigmatically 
contemplation of the universe: that is what we should aim at so far as we are able (10.7, 1177b33-
4). But it is impossible for humans to attain this divine life uninterruptedly (Met. 12.7, 1072b14-
16); so other objects of appreciative attention are needed.  
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human nature, such that human beings are spontaneously motivated to attend to 
them. Since pleasure is unimpeded activity in accordance with a natural 
disposition (NE 7.12, 1153a13-15) or is the completion or perfection of such 
activity (10.4, 1174b31-3), attending to such objects will be naturally 
pleasurable²or will be so to the extent that a cognitive capacity in optimal 
condition is directed towards the best object that falls within the scope of that 
capacity (b14-31). Music fits this model easily: the natural pleasure in melody and 
UK\WKPSRLQWVWRWKHVRXO¶VDIILQLW\ZLWKPHORGLFDQGUK\WKPLFVWUXFWXUHVPol. 8.5, 
1340b17-19). Aristotle thinks that poetry is rooted in human nature in part 
because of the natural pleasure in melody and rhythm (Poet. 4, 1448b20-2), but 
also because of a natural human propensity for imitation and taking pleasure in 
imitations (1448b5-19). More specifically, poetry is imitation of agents and their 
actions (2, 1447b2; 3, 1448a25-7; 4, 1448b25-6), and it is easy to see why highly 
social animals with a propensity for taking pleasure in imitations should be 
especially motivated to take an interest in imitations of conspecific agents and 
their actions. 
These points provide at least a partial explanation of the motivation of poetry 
LQ JHQHUDO %XW ZKDW DUH ZH WR VD\ DERXW WUDJHG\ LQ SDUWLFXODU" $ULVWRWOH¶V
technical analyses in the Poetics show that good tragedy is good in part because it 
is capable of evoking pity and fear (6, 1449b27; 9, 1452a1-3; 11, 1452a36-b3; 13, 
1452b30-3a7; 14, 1453b1-14). These are distressing affects (Rhet 2.5, 1382a21; 
2.8, 1385b13). Why, then do good tragedies give pleasure? To say, with Poetics 4, 
that humans naturally take pleasure in imitating and consuming imitations, and in 
melody and rhythm, is not a sufficient explanation. We could gain those pleasures 
from drama that allowed us to rejoice in the deserved good fortune of virtuous 
agents, without our having to experience any distressing emotion. Nor does it help 
to point to the pleasure we take in pictures of aversive objects. When Aristotle 
comments on the pleasure we take in such pictures (Poet. 4, 1448b9-17), he gives 
compelling evidence of the strength of our propensity to take pleasure in 
imitations as such; but he does not address the question of why we might choose 
to look at pictures of aversive objects when pictures of things that are nice to look 
at would also afford the pleasure that we take in imitations as such. Nor can we 
appeal to the pleasure that a cultivated audience gains through its appreciation of 
the fineness of a fine tragedy. That pleasure presupposes an activity developed to 
a high degree of excellence; but no activity can develop before it gets started. 
What needs to be explained, therefore, is the initial motivation of a dramatic form 
that subjects its audiences to distressing emotions. A solution to this problem 
requires a pleasure that is inseparable from the experience of pity and fear. 
Aristotle clearly thinks that there is such a pleasure: he describes the 
µFKDUDFWHULVWLFSOHDVXUH¶RI WUDJHG\DVWKHSOHDVXUHWKDWFRPHVIURPSLW\DQGIHDU
through imitation (14, 1453b11-13). He gives no indication that the experience of 
pity and fear loses the element of distress when it comes through imitation. On the 
FRQWUDU\ ZKHQ KH EODPHV WKH SUHIHUHQFH IRU µGRXEOH¶ SORWV LQ WUDJHG\ ZLWK
negative outcomes for bad characters, and positive outcomes for good ones) on 
the weakness of audiences (13, 1453a30-4), there is an implication that some 
GHPDQG LV PDGH RQ WKH DXGLHQFH¶V HPRWLRQDO HQGXUDQFH E\ WKH H[SHULHQFH RI
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intense tragic affect. But he does not explain the pleasure that comes from that 
experience. At any rate, he does not do so explicitly.  
4. Katharsis 
One widely canvassed solution to this problem is that the pleasure that comes 
from pity and fear through imitation is the pleasure that attends katharsis. Tragic 
katharsis is mentioned in passing in the Poetics (6, 1449b27-8), but not (in the 
extant text, at least) explained; we are not even told that there is an attendant 
pleasure. We are therefore compelled to fall back on Politics 8.7, even though 
Aristotle warns us there that he is giving an outline account, to be developed more 
clearly in connection with poetry (1341b38-40). But that outline does, at least, 
make explicit a connection between musical katharsis and pleasure (1342a14-16); 
and if tragic katharsis of pity and fear gives rise to pleasure, that pleasure will 
certainly be inseparable from the experience of distressing affect. There is, 
however, a difficulty. It seems at first sight that Aristotle understands musical 
katharsis as therapeutic: but therapy is not chosen because of itself. Moreover, 
therapeutic katharsis would have least significance for the best members of an 
audience: yet the appreciative audience of fine music must be in excellent 
FRQGLWLRQ , VKDOO WU\ WR VKRZ WKDW WKLV GLIILFXOW\ FDQ EH HOLPLQDWHG LI$ULVWRWOH¶V
argument is read with careful attention to its structure.  
The context is a discussion of which harmoniai9 and rhythms should be used 
in musical education (1341b19-2a4). Aristotle borrows from unnamed 
philosophical experts on music a distinction between three kinds of melody: 
ethical, practical and enthusiastic. He specifies that only the most ethical 
harmoniai are to be used in education, when children are learning to play an 
instrument; but he goes on to say that the repertoire appropriate for audiences 
listening to others perform is wider, and includes practical and enthusiastic 
harmoniai as well. The key passage on katharsis follows (1342a4-18). To bring 
out its structure, I have emphasised the linking expressions, and numbered the five 
stages which they mark out:  
[1] For the affect that occurs in some souls strongly exists in all, but in different 
degrees: e.g. pity and fear²and also enthusiasm. [2] For some are possessed by 
this disturbance, too, and we see that, under the influence of the sacred melodies, 
whenever they employ the melodies that excite extreme frenzy in the soul, they 
are restored, as if having undergone medical treatment and katharsis. [3] The 
very same thing, necessarily, is experienced by those prone to pity or to fear or, 
in general, to any affect, and by others to the extent that each is susceptible to 
such things; and for all there comes about a certain katharsis and alleviation with 
pleasure. [4] In the same way, kathartic melodies, too, provide harmless pleasure 
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 $ULVWRWOHZDYHUVEHWZHHQµPHORG\¶melos) and harmonia (plural, harmoniai). On the latter see 
Andrew Barker, Greek Musical Writings: I. The Musician and his Art (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 163- WKH SULPDU\ XVH µLV probably that which designates the 
DGMXVWPHQWRUWXQLQJRIWKHQRWHVRIDQLQVWUXPHQW:KDWLVFUHDWHGE\WXQLQJLVD³ILWWLQJWRJHWKHU´
of notes, a structure of relations that can be used to form the basis of melodies. In Plato, harmonia 
conceived generally is the melodic counterpart to rhythm: it is the scheme of order that 
GLVWLQJXLVKHVWKHQRWHVXVHGLQDSLHFHRIPXVLFIURPDPHUHFROOHFWLRQRISLWFKHV¶ 
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to human beings. [5] That is why the use of such harmoniai and such melodies 
should be allowed to competitors taking part in public musical performances.  
7KLVSDVVDJH LV LQWURGXFHG LQ >@ µIRU¶DVDQH[SODQDWLRQRU MXVWLILFDWLRQRI
the preceding statement about the harmoniai permissible in public performance; 
and in [5] Aristotle signals that the explanation has been successfully concluded.10 
The progression from introduction to conclusion is effected by three intermediate 
VWDJHV7KHDUJXPHQW¶VLQWHUQDOVWUXFWXUHZLOOEHFRPHFOHDUHULIZHIRFXVRQWKUHH
respects in which these intermediate stages differ: who is affected, the specified 
effect, and what produces that effect.  
,Q >@ WKH SHRSOH DIIHFWHG DUH µSRVVHVVHG E\¶ HQWKXVLDVP WKDW LV D VWURQJ
expression, suggesting an extreme or pathological condition. The effect is 
described as katharsis, and also as restorative and as comparable to medical 
treatment (which is appropriate to a pathological state). This restorative effect is 
SURGXFHGE\µWKHVDFUHGPHORGLHV¶7KHSHRSOHDIIHFWHGLQ>@ LQFOXGHWKRVHµprone 
WR¶ EXW WKHUHIRUH QRW µSRVVHVVHG E\¶ D YDULHW\ RI HPRWLRQV DQG µRWKHUV WR WKH
H[WHQW WKDW HDFK LV VXVFHSWLEOH WR VXFK WKLQJV¶ WKLV LV FOHDUO\ D ZLGHU FODVV RI
people than in [2]. The effect is katharsis of a kind (katharsis tis), alleviation (a 
ZHDNHU H[SUHVVLRQ WKDQ µPHGLFDO WUHDWPHQW¶ DQG SOHDsure²something not 
mentioned in [2]. Aristotle does not specify what has this effect on these people: 
we shall return to that question shortly. In [4], the class of people affected is all-
inclusive: µKXPDQ EHLQJV¶ 7KH HIIHFW LV µKDUPOHVV SOHDVXUH¶ SOHDVXre is shared 
with [3], as against [2]. There is no reference to medical treatment or alleviation; 
EXWVLQFHWKHHIIHFWLVSURGXFHGE\µNDWKDUWLFPHORGLHV¶11 we can assume that the 
effect includes katharsis of a kind, as well as harmless pleasure. More precisely, 
WKHHIIHFWLVSURGXFHGE\µNDWKDUWLFPHORGLHVtoo¶Harmless pleasure is provided 
by kathartic melodies as well as by the unspecified source of the effect in [3]. To 
say that kathartic melodies produce pleasure, and so do kathartic melodies, would 
be nonsensical. It follows that [3] cannot have been concerned with kathartic 
melodies. Since it is certainly concerned with something kathartic, we must 
conclude that it is not concerned with kathartic melodies. In other words, [3] steps 
outside the musical domain.  
One conclusion, at least, emerges clearly from this analysis: the transitional 
IRUPXODHZKLFKOLQNWKHLQWHUPHGLDWHVWDJHVµ7KHYHU\VDPHWKLQJ,QWKHVDPH
ZD\¶ GR QRW PHDQ WKDW$ULVWRWOH LV OLWHUDOO\ VD\LQJ WKH YHU\ VDPH WKLQJ WKUHH
times over. Rather, he is inviting us to see three different phenomena as relevantly 
VLPLODU 7KH WKHUDSHXWLF H[SHULHQFH ZKLFK WKH XVH RI FHUWDLQ µVDFUHG¶ PHORGLHV
provides for the pathological few, and a pleasurable non-musical experience, 
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 7KHUH LVDVOLSSDJH LQ WKHSDVVDJH IURPWKHSUHIDWRU\ µSUDFWLFDODQGHQWKXVLDVWLF¶ WRµNDWKDUWLF¶
WKHDQWHFHGHQWRIµVXFKharmoniai DQGVXFKPHORGLHV¶LQ>@PXVWEHµNDWKDUWLFPHORGLHV¶LQ>@
If enthusiastic melodies were controversial because of the emotional arousal they induce, 
substituting a different term would have tactical point. In that case, enthusiastic melodies are co-
extensive with kathartic melodies, and the permission granted to practical melodies is treated as 
needing no special defence.  
11
 I translate the text as transmitted in the manuscripts. Some editors and translators substitute the 
FRQMHFWXUHµSUDFWLFDO¶IRUµNDWKDUWLF¶6LQFHWKHPDQXVFULSWUHDGLQJLVOLQJXLVWLFDOO\XQREMHFWLRQDEOH
there are no grounds for conjectural emendation if (as I try to show here) it also yields satisfactory 
sense. 
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throw light on the experience which a larger class of kathartic melodies affords to 
everyone, including those who are not in need of therapy. The pleasure of musical 
katharsis is therefore not inextricably bound to a therapeutic effect, and is 
available to an audience in excellent condition. That resolves the difficulty 
identified at the start of this section. But it has not resolved all our difficulties: we 
still do not know what that experience is. 
5. Pleasure  
Why is katharsis pleasurable? Aristotle does not tell us: he has, after all, 
warned us that he is only giving an outline account. But license for cautious 
conjecture can be found in the absence of even the briefest explanation of what 
causes the effect in [3]. Since Aristotle did not think it necessary to provide an 
explanation, or to identify a specific non-musical domain, it is reasonable to infer 
that he is referring to an everyday experience sufficiently commonplace for 
readers to be able to supply the explanation for themselves.12 A minimalist 
interpretation might invoke the experience of pleasurable relief experienced when 
an episode of distressing affect abates. But in [2] there is a disposition that pre-
exists the musically induced affective episode that produces the kathartic effect. A 
better parallel to this would be provided by the experience of (for example) 
someone in a state of irritation, whose mood is released when an angry episode is 
stimulated. In such cases, pleasurable relief is experienced when the distressing 
affect abates and (simultaneously) the burdensome pre-existing mood is removed. 
However, it is unlikely that in [4] we are to think of emotionally well-adjusted 
members of an audience bringing a burdensome mood with them to the concert: 
rather, the mood and/or affective episode are both induced and released within the 
musical performance itself.13 In the case of tragedy, there is no doubt that the 
affective episode is induced by the performance: that is why such a large 
SURSRUWLRQRI$ULVWRWOH¶VWHFKQLFDOUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVDUHFRQFHUQHGZLWKKRZEest 
to elicit pity and fear.  
But that leaves us with a further puzzle: why would emotionally well-adjusted 
people seek a pleasure that is preceded by distress in the absence of a disorder for 
which the experience would provide therapeutic benefit? Inducing distress simply 
for the pleasure of alleviating it seems perverse. The perversity may lie, however, 
not in the activity itself, but in the underlying structure of human nature, which is 
complex and conflicted; Aristotle himself describes it as containing µD NLQG RI
                                                 
12
 Thus Wolfgang Schadewaldt, µ)XUFKW XQG 0LWOHLG" =XU 'HXWXQJ GHU DULVWRWHOLVFKH
7UDJ|GLHQVDW]HV¶ Hermes 83 (1955), 129- DW  µ'DVVHOEH NDQQ PDQ LP /HEHQ
EHREDFKWHQ¶ FI +HOOPXW )ODVKDU µ'LH PXVLNDOLVFKH XQG GLH SRHWLVFKH .DWKDUVLV¶ LQ 0DUWLQ
Vöhler and Bernd Seidensticker (eds), Katharsiskonzeptionen vor Aristoteles: zum kulturellen 
Hintergrund des Tragödiensatzes (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 173-DWµKLHUJHKWHV
QLFKWXPGLH:LUNXQJGHU0XVLNVRQGHUQXP(UIDKUXQJHQDXVGHP/HEHQ¶ 
13
 G.M. Sifakis, Aristotle on the Function of Tragic Poetry (Herakleion: Crete University Press, 
µ&DWKDUVLV WKHUHIRUHKDVWREHa pleasurable relief following the excitation of certain 
emotions produced by the representations of music which affect our moral dispositions. There is 
nothing burdensome or painful to be shed or got rid of other than the termination of the excitement 
LWVHOI¶RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV6LPLODUO\6FKDGHZDOGWµ)XUFKWXQG0LWOHLG"¶-162; G.R.F. Ferrari, 
µ$ULVWRWOH¶VOLWHUDU\DHVWKHWLFV¶Phronesis 44 (1999), 181-198, at 194-196.  
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SHUYHUVLW\¶SRQƝULDWLV). For humans to behave in accordance with their nature is 
reasonable and unobjectionable. The apparent perversity of the taste for tragedy is 
therefore an illusion which an understanding of its natural roots will dispel. 
$ULVWRWOH¶V FODLP DERXW WKH SHUYHUVLW\ RI KXPDQ QDWXUH LV PDGH LQ WKH ODVW
chapter of the discussion of pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics 7. In this chapter 
Aristotle confronts and rejects the view that bodily pleasures (that is, pleasures of 
touch and, derivatively, of taste: NE 3.10, 1118a26-32; EE 3.2, 1230b36-8, 
1232a12-15) are, as such, bad: what is bad is pursuing them to excess (NE 7.14, 
1154a15-18).14 He then poses the question: what is it that makes people pursue 
bodily pleasures to excess? His reply comprises two main points. First, bodily 
pleasure is pursued as a remedy for distress: to offset the intensity of distress, a 
contrastingly intense bodily pleasure is sought, and that produces a tendency to 
excess (1154a26-31). Secondly, even in the absence of distress, the intensity of 
bodily pleasure is pursued by those who are incapable of enjoying other pleasures; 
and most people find an otherwise neutral state distressing, because animal life is 
burdensome (1154b2-9). Aristotle has already mentioned that pleasure is 
denigrated by some on the grounds that, even when it is not the operation of a bad 
nature, it is remedial: since remedy presupposes deficiency, and since being 
restored to a sound state is inferior to being in a sound state, remedial pleasures 
are only incidentally pleasurable (1154a31-b2). Now he responds to that 
argument. First, though he agrees that being remedied is only incidentally 
pleasurable, he points out that when something is being remedied, there is also 
something that is effecting the remedy²some part of the organism that is still in a 
healthy state: and the operation of nature in a healthy state is naturally, not 
incidentally, pleasant (1154b15-20; cf. 7.12, 1152b31-3a2). Secondly, he reflects 
on the implications of the complexity of human nature. Our intellect is embodied, 
and what is natural to one part of us is in conflict with the nature of the other. 
When the two are in balance there is neither pleasure nor distress²but, as has 
already been said, a neutral state is itself unsatisfactory. So humans, unlike gods, 
cannot be satisfied with a constant pleasurable equilibrium (1154b20-8). For 
KXPDQEHLQJVFKDQJHLV LWVHOISOHDVDQWDQGZKLOHWKLVPD\EHGXHWRµDNLQGRI
SHUYHUVLW\¶RIKXPDQQDWXUH there is no exemption from the consequences of that 
perversity (1154b28-31).  
In the course of his discussion of these issues, Aristotle makes passing 
mention of the possibility that pleasure may be intensified by artificially induced 
distress. When he claims that bodily pleasure is pursued by those who are 
incapable of enjoying other pleasures, he mentions as an example people who 
make themselves thirsty (1154b2-4). The point is apparently that this enables them 
to enjoy the quenching of the thirst, and that the contrast between the thirst and 
the subsequent restored state of not being thirsty makes the latter more enjoyable. 
Not being thirsty is a pleasure to which we usually pay little attention: it becomes 
                                                 
14
 2QWKLVFKDSWHUVHH*ZHQDsOOH$XEU\µNicomachean Ethics VII.14 (1154a22-b34): the pain of 
WKH OLYLQJ DQG GLYLQH SOHDVXUH¶ LQ &DUOR 1DWDOL HG Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII 
(Oxford: OUP, 2009), 237--RDFKLP$XIGHUKHLGH µ3URFHVVHVDVSOHDVXUHV LQ EN vii 11-14: a 
QHZDSSURDFK¶Ancient Philosophy 33 (2013), 135-SURYLGHVDKHOSIXODQDO\VLVRI$ULVWRWOH¶V
account of pleasure in NE 7.11-14.  
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more salient after we have been thirsty. This pattern of artificially induced distress 
intensifying the pleasure of the restoration and of the restored equilibrium is 
parallel in structure to that suggested for musical and tragic katharsis, and gives a 
clearer sense of how Aristotle might have conceived the harmless pleasure to 
which kathartic music and tragedy lead.  
Aristotle takes a tolerant attitude to the practice of making oneself thirsty: he 
says that it is unobjectionable when the thirsts are harmless, though not if they 
FDXVHKDUPSUHVXPDEO\E\GDPDJLQJRQH¶VKHDOWK54b5-6).15 His approval of 
self-induced thirst is, admittedly, muted: the practice is attributed to those who are 
incapable of pursuing pleasures other than those of the body. So, as well as a basic 
structural similarity between artificially induced thirst and artificially induced 
emotional distress, there must also be significant differences if this parallel is to 
throw any light on tragedy. There are such differences. First, and most obviously, 
the alleviation of distressing affect is not a bodily pleasure; therefore, the kathartic 
pleasure from pity and fear is not pursued by those who are incapable of pursuing 
pleasures other than those of the body. Secondly, while thirst is a symptom of a 
lack in the individual who is experiencing it, an affective response to a proper 
object of that affect (for example, fear in response to something that is fearful), 
even if it is distressing, is not: on the contrary, it expresses virtuous character. 
Thirdly, it is a straightforward consequence of what Aristotle says about virtue, 
and about pleasure, that the proper activity of a virtuous character is pleasurable to 
a virtuous person (NE 1.8, 1099a7-21).  
That last point needs further consideration, since it posits an experience with a 
distinctive kind of complexity. There are other kinds of complexity in Aristotelian 
affects. Anger, for example, is a form of distress, but an angry person anticipates 
vengeance, which is pleasurable in two respects: the belief that one is going to 
achieve some aim is pleasant, and so are the images which arise when one dwells 
on the thought of vengeance (Rhet. 2.2, 1378a30-b10; cf. 1.11, 1370b10-15). Even 
grief and lamentation can be accompanied by pleasure: the loss of a loved one 
causes distress, but there is pleasure in the imagery that arises from remembering 
and visualising the deceased, and their actions and character (1.11, 1370b25-9). In 
those cases a pleasure co-exists with the distressing affect. But we are concerned 
here with cases in which the experience of distressing affect qua expression of 
virtuous character is the pleasure. The point is not that the virtuous person gets 
pleasure from the thought that he or she is being virtuous: rather, the virtuous 
DFWLYLW\ LV WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW LW LPSLQJHV RQ WKH SHUVRQ¶V DZDUHQHVV LWVHOI
e[SHULHQFHG DV SOHDVXUDEOH $ULVWRWOH¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI FRXUDJH PD\ KHOS WR
understand his conception of the pleasure embedded in a distressing exercise of 
virtue (NE 3.9, 1117a29-b22). The exercise of courage in battle is distressing, 
because it involves confronting the possibility of painful injury or death. But even 
as Aristotle acknowledges that the circumstances in which courage is exercised 
WHQGWRPDNHWKHSOHDVXUHµGLVDSSHDU¶D-b6), he is unwilling to surrender 
the principle that virtuous activity as such is pleasurable to the virtuous. Even in 
this case, the goal remains a source of pleasure²that is, there is pleasure in acting 
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 The criterion of harmlessness is one that we have already met in the outline account of 
katharsis: its significance will become clearer in the Conclusion. 
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IRU WKHVDNHRIµWKHILQH¶D-6, b15-16). Displaying courage in the face of 
death is a limiting case. When the circumstances are less extreme, by implication, 
the pleasure does not disappear. When we are watching tragedies in the theatre the 
circumstances could hardly be less extreme. That does not mean that the distress 
disappears: as we have already seen, Aristotle thinks that it is a weakness on the 
part of audiences that generates a preference for plots in which the tragic effect is 
mitigated (13, 1453a30-4). But the affective experience evoked by tragedy, as a 
proper expression of virtuous character, is properly pleasurable to a virtuous 
person.16  
6. Conclusion 
:HEHJDQZLWKTXHVWLRQVDERXWWUDJHG\¶VPRWLYDWLRQDQGDERXWLWVYDOXH7KH
DQVZHU WR WKH ILUVW TXHVWLRQ DERXW WUDJHG\¶V PRWLYDWLRQ VWDUWV IURP $ULVWRWOH¶V
belief that some objects of attention are naturally pleasurable to humans: these 
include, for example, music, because melody and rhythm are naturally 
pleasurable, and poetry, both because it is melodic and/or rhythmical, and because 
humans take pleasure in imitations. But tragedy poses a particular problem, since 
it aims to arouse an affective response that is found distressing: in what sense 
could that be naturally pleasurable? Tragedy produces katharsis of the distressing 
affects it evokes. The outline account of musical katharsis allows us to conclude 
that tragic katharsis LVDOVRSOHDVXUDEOH$ULVWRWOH¶VGLVFXVVLRQRINDWKDUWLFPXVLF
EHJLQVZLWKWKHWKHUDSHXWLFLQIOXHQFHRIRQHNLQGRINDWKDUWLFPXVLFµWKHVDFUHG
PHORGLHV¶RQLQGLYLGXDOVSDWKRORJLFDOO\VXVFHSWLEOHWRHQWKXVLDVPDQGSURFHHGV
to the everyday experience of pleasurable relief when other distressing affective 
states or episodes abate. But its final destination is the harmlessly pleasurable 
katharsis that everyone, including emotionally well-adjusted individuals, can 
derive from musical performances which induce a distressing affective episode. 
We are willing to expose ourselves to emotional distress because this opens the 
way to the pleasure experienced as that distress abates, and because the contrast 
makes the pleasure of the subsequent emotional equilibrium more salient. The 
apparent perversity of artificially inducing distress for the pleasure of relief 
becomes intelligible in the light of the complexity of human nature, which 
demands contrasting, intense and varied pleasure.  
That answers the question of motivation. What of the question of value? Plato 
had maintained, in Republic 10, that the kinds of poetry that stimulate intense 
emotion should be banned because they are harmful (605c-6d); he also insisted 
that a defence of emotive poetry would need to show that it was beneficial 
(607d6-9). Since Aristotle has a high regard for the poetic genres that fall under 
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 This Aristotelian pleasure (part of the direct response to the tragedy) is therefore different from 
the pleasure discussed in 6XVDQ / )HDJLQ µ7KH SOHDVXUHV RI WUDJHG\¶ American Philosophical 
Quarterly 20 (1983), 95-104 (a higher-order response to the direct response to the tragedy). In 
0DOFROP +HDWK µ$ULVWRWOH DQG WKH SOHDVXUHV RI WUDJHG\¶ LQ LYLQG$QGHUVHQ DQG -RQ +DDUEHUJ 
(eds), Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics (London: Duckworth, 2001), 7-23, I failed to 
make this distinction. I also conjectured that the pleasure arising from the expression of virtuous 
character is the characteristic pleasure of tragedy. That (I now believe) was an error, to which I was 
driven because I was unable to give a non-therapeutic account of katharsis. Even so, this pleasure 
must have a place in an Aristotelian account of the psychology of tragedy. 
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3ODWR¶V EDQ +RPHULF HSLF WUDJHG\ DQG FRPHG\ ZH PD\ LQIHU WKDW KH GLG QRW
DJUHHZLWK3ODWR¶VFODLPWKDWWKH\DUHKDUPIXO%ut he does not agree, either, that 
he is under an obligation to show that they are beneficial. He excludes young 
people from performances of comedy, because they may be harmed if they are 
H[SRVHG WRFRPHG\¶VDEXVHDQGREVFHQLW\EXWKHSHUPLWVDGXOW WRDWWend on the 
grounds that their education makes them immune to that harm (Pol. 7.17, 
1336b20-3). Having more confidence than Plato in the stability of adult character, 
he believes that comedy will not be harmful to adults²and that is sufficient 
defence: he does not try to show that comedy will be beneficial. Similarly, the 
licensing of kathartic music for public performance follows from the claim that it 
provides harmless pleasure.  
)URP$ULVWRWOH¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ WKH GHPDQG ZKLFK 3ODWR WULHV WR LPSRVH RQ
poeWU\¶V GHIHQGHUV LV HLWKHU FRQIXVHG RU FUDVV ,W LV FRQIXVHG LI LW DSSOLHV WR WKH
value of everything, since that produces a regress (§1). But if it applies 
VSHFLILFDOO\ WR SRHWU\ 3ODWR¶V LQVWUXPHQWDOLVDWLRQ RI SRHWU\ GLVSOD\V D FUDVV
insensitivity to poetU\¶V SRWHQWLDO IRU LQWULQVLF YDOXH 7UDJHG\ LV IRU KXPDQV D
naturally pleasurable object of attention; the response which good tragedy evokes 
is expressive of good character; and spectators with a suitably cultivated poetic 
discernment will take pleasure in excellent tragedies because of their excellence²
that is, because they are fine. This possibility makes fine tragedy, like fine music, 
an appropriate object of appreciative attention in leisure (§3). That is not, of 
course, to say that Aristotle denied that tragedy is beneficial: the one thing that is 
only ever chosen because of itself, and never because of something else, is 
eudaimonia (NE 1.7, 1097a34-b1). Though he does not discuss the possible 
EHQHILWV RI WUDJHG\ ZH NQRZ WKDW KH YDOXHG PXVLF¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR FKLOGUHQ¶V
moral education, and that he recognised katharsis, relaxation and leisure as 
benefits it affords to adults (Pol. 8.7, 1341b36-41). The point is that this is not the 
most important question. What is worth choosing because of itself is of more 
value than what is worth choosing only because of something else. The most 
important question about the value of tragedy is therefore what makes it worth 
choosing independently of any benefits which it may (or may not) confer.17  
Interpretations of $ULVWRWOH¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI D JRRG KXPDQ OLIH WHQG WR EH
dominated by the practical demands of ethics and politics on the one hand, and by 
the pre-eminent value of philosophical contemplation on the other. Both are, of 
course, important. But the former does not account for the importance which 
Aristotle attaches to the proper use of unconstrained time, and the latter cannot 
occupy the unconstrained time of a human life uninterruptedly²we are not gods. 
Despite that deficiency, the capacities which distinguish us from other animals 
make it possible for us to recognise excellence in a variety of activities congruent 
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 Aristotle counts harmless pleasure (and therefore the pleasure of katharsis) as a benefit (contrary 
WR WKH WHUPV RI 3ODWR¶V FKDOOHQJH WR SRHWU\¶V GHIHQGHUV +H DOVR FRXQWV WKH FRQWULEXWLRQ RI ILQH
music and tragedy to leisure as a benefit. However, music and tragedy would not be appropriate 
components of leisure if they were not also worth choosing, and were not in fact chosen, because 
of themselves. Similarly, virtuous action is chosen because of eudaimonia, but also because of 
itself (NE 1.7, 1097b2-6); and an action that was not worth choosing, and were not in fact chosen, 
because of itself it would not be virtuous action (NE 2.4, 1105a32), and would therefore not 
contribute to eudaimonia.    
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with our human nature, and to value that excellence because of itself. Neglect of 
$ULVWRWOH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIOHLVXUHREVFXUHVWKHULFKQHVVRIKLVFRQFeption of a good 
human life, and places an obstacle in the way of progress in understanding his 
aesthetics.  
